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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
G-

c. it.

EKLUND, doing business under the
name of:

C. G. EKLUND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 7256

v.
CLINTON L. ELWELL,
Defendant and Appellant:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant to recover the sum of $1,499.05 for labor claimed to have been performed and materials claimed furnished the defendant at his
special instance and request by the plaintiff, and plaintiff claims
defendant agreed to pay for said labor and materials. (It is not
alleged whom to upon what basis he promised to pay.)
The labor performed and material furnished were in connection with the installat.ion of certain electrical wiring, parts
and equipment in a service station at 757 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah; and it is alleged that the work was done and the
materials furnished in the name of Empey Electric Company
for plaintiff's benefit, that the work was completed on or about
February 7, 1947, and that a statement was submitted in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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name of Empey Electric Company, but for plaintiff's use and
benefit. Plaintiff alleges that Empey Electric Company claimed
no interest in the sum owing and that plaintiff had paid for said
labor and materials (although it is not stated whom plaintiff
claims to have paid). Plaintiff claimed to be the legal owner
and holder of the claim. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 001).
A general demurrer was filed to the complaint. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 004). And the same was over-ruled. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 005).
Defendant answered said complaint, denying the allegations of the complaint, alleging that by virtue of a verbal agreement with one H. B. Empey, doing business as Empey Electric
Company, the said labor was performed and materials were
furnished by him (Empey) at an agreed upon price of $750.00,
less an offset for certain moneys due and owing defendant by
Empey, the balance to· be paid Empey at the completion of the
verbal contract.
Defendant alleges Empey agreed to perform all the labor
and furnish all the materials in and about the wiring of a service station at 757 Washington Boulevard, in Ogden and including a garage at said address, and also including wiring
three gasoline pumps and a flood light adjacent to the service
station; that the material to be furnished included all conduits,
all switch boxes and plugs, including one master switch and all
wire. All materials were to be new and first class and labor to be
performed in a good,· safe and workman-like manner and so
as to pass city inspection. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 015).
Defendant alleged (and it was admitted at the trial) that
plaintiff had nothing to do at all with the original contract, and
that all the labor was performed and materials were furnished
by and under the control and supervision of H. B. Empey, and
that plaintiff, so far as defendant knew, claimed no interest in
_ the contract until long after Empey discontinued work at the
job. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 007 and 017).
2
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Defendant alleged that after the contract was let and most
of the work done, plaintiff and Empey conspired one with the
other for plaintiff to claim the benefits of the contract in order
to defeat defendant's offset against the alleged agreed upon
price. (Bill of Exceptions, _Page 007).
And defendant prayed the court to interplead Empey as a11
interpleaded plaintiff for a complete, speedy and adequate adjudication of the claims of all parties involved. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 008); and by order of the court H. B. Empey was
interpleaded (Bill of Exceptions, Page 009). He filed a general
denial jointly with plaintiff. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 021).
In defendant's amended answer he alleged that Empey failed
and neglected to complete his verbal contract in this, that he
failed and refused to furnish plug boxes with covers to make
them safe to his damage in the sum of $5.70; wired the gasoline
pumps so as to leave the same open to the spilling of gasoline,
constituting a fire hazard, and would not pass inspection, to his
damage in the sum of $65.00; that he did not extend the wiring
to the flood light to his damage in the sum of $12.50. Defendant
claimed an agreed upon offset against Empey in the sum of
$137.23 for gas and oil theretofore furnished, $6.50 for a thermostat, $12.50 for defective wiring of a gas furnace by Empey,
and for which he was paid; for $46.95 for a fluorescent lighting
fixture purchased by defendant from Empey and paid for but
not delivered, and for $23.55 in addition, paid to Empey by
defendant for work he had failed to perform. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 015 and 016). Defendant claimed an offset against
Empey in the total of $252.19, leaving a balance due him in the
sum of $497.81 (Bill of Excepti.ons, Page 017), which said sum
defendant alleged Empey agreed to accept, and that the defendant had at all times stood ready to pay upon completion
of the contract.
Defendant filed a reply denying the joint allegations of
plaintiff and interpleaded plaintiff to the effect that all sums
owing from Empey to defendan-t had been paid. (Bill of Excep3
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tions, Page 022).
The case w'ent to trial before the Honorable John A. Hendricks, one of the judges of the Second Judicial Court, sitting
without a jury, on the 13th day of April, 1948, resulting in a
judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the
sum of $1 ,499.00, the exact amount demanded, with interest and
eosts. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 026).
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and after arguments were heard, the judgment was amended by allowing defendant an offset against the interpleaded plaintiff Empey in
the sum of $137.23 without interest, thereby reducing the judgment against defendant to $1,361.82 with interest and costs. (Bill
of Exceptions, Pages 031 and 032).
A brief resume of the evidence is as follows:
The Eklund Electric Company is the plaintiff. Mr. H. B.
Empey, Interpleaded Plaintiff, and a Mr. Shaw (Gilbert) and a
Mr. Mumford did the work on this defendant's job. They commenced in August, 1946, and finished in February, 1947. (Bill
of Exceptions, Pages 4 and 5). Plaintiff did not go out to the
job, but Mr. Empey went out about every morning. They took
the materials from plaintiff's shop, but it was taken to defendant's service station by Mr. Empey, who supervised and assisted in the work daily. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 7). Empey
always outlined the work. Plaintiff never did outline or do any
of the work, (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 8 and 9). Mr. Shaw
checked over the work, which he testified he and the other men
did for interpleaded plaintiff, Mr. Empey, which he said corresponded with plaintiff's Exhibit "A". (Bill of Exceptions, Page
11). Each and every page in plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is signed
"H. B. Empey", with no reference whatsoever to plaintiff.
The Eklund Electric Company place of business was at
309-24th Street in Ogden, over sixteen blocks from defendant's
job. Exhibit "A" consists of weekly time sheets turned in by
interpleaded plaintiff, Empey, and in his handwriting. The esti4
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'
mated cost of the electrical work on defendant's job by Builders,
Inc., the general contractor, was $750.00 (see defendant's Exhibit 2). The only statement furnished defendant was on May
29, 1947, and headed "Empey Electric Company", Ogden, Utah.
(See defendant's Exhibit ( 1) .) (Bill of Exceptions, Page 28).
Interpleaded plaintiff had been previously working for defendant and submitted him a statement of this work as of August
6, 1946, on "Empey Electric Co." statement. (See defendant's
Exhibit .(3).) (Also see defendant's Exhibits (4) and (5).)
As a matter of fact, all of the transactions (and there were
many) before the contract which forms the basis of this action
had been between the interpleaded plaintiff Empey and the
defendant. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 50, 51 and 52).
Plaintiff admitted that Mr. Empey did this job. (Bill of
Exceptions, Page 15). Evidence was admitted to show the reasonable value of the labor performed and materials furnished in
the amounts sued for. The plaintiff admitted he was not a licensed electrical contractor during this job, but that Mr. Empey
was a licensed electrical contractor under the name of Empey
Electric Company. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 20). The permit to
do the defendant's job was taken out and issued by Ogden City
to Empey Electric Company, and plaintiff had no negotiations
with the defendant concerJ?ing this job. In fact, he never did
talk to the defendant until "after the job was just about completed," (Bill of Exceptions,. Page 21) or after it was completed.
He had no agreement with defendant concerning prices or costs.
He never did submit a statement to defendant, neither before,
at the time of or after completion of the work. Plaintiff claims
he stopped in at the .job as he went by on a few occasions, but
that he never did see defendant there. (Bill of Exceptions, Page
22).

The union scale of wages for electricians was $1.62Yz per
hour. Contractors selling hourly wage scale was $2.25. (Bill of
Exceptions, Pages 23, 40 and 43). The hourly wage scale for
laborers was 75c, and the contractor's selling price $1.25. (Bill
of Exceptions, Pages 24, 40 and 43). No 0. P. A. prices of maS
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terials were produced or offered. Plaintiff kept no records on
this job except as they were handed to him, presumably by
Empey. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 26).
Defendant refused to pay plaintiff anything upon being
called by him, for the reason that he had no dealings with him;
that his dealings were all with Empey; that Empey owed him
some money which he was going to deduct. (Bill of Exceptions,
Pages 30 and 33).
There was some hearsay evidence claiming that Empey was
plaintiff's agent, none of which was legally admissable. (Bill of
Exceptions, Pages 36 and 37). The contract was negotiated at
defendant's office, 20th Street and Washington Boulevard and
at' 757 Washington Boulevard between Empey, Interpleaded
Plaintiff, defendant and a representative of the general contractor, with whom Empey che·cked the plans. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 47 and 48). Empey admitted examining defendant's
Exhibit (2), including the estimated cost of wiring, but denied
he agreed to do the work for $750.00. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages
49 and 61). He admitted doing work previously for defendant
and receiving the pay and receipting for it. (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 49), and said defendant "called me to do it" (this job),
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 55), and admitted that defendant
asked for the price of $750.00 when they were checking the
general contractor's estimates, (Bill of Exceptions, Page 61),
and that he used the general contractor's plans and specifications on the job. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 63) .
.Murphy-Neill Electric Co., were called in to complete part
of the work contracted by Empey, (Bill of Exceptions, Page 66),
rewire the pumps left in dangerous conditions (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 67 and 68). His reasonable costs were $88.30 (.Bill
of Exceptions, Page 70). (See also Exhibit 8).
T. E. Meyers, City Electrical Inspector, inspected pumps
after Empey left the job and found them improperly wired. He
notified Empey and defendant that they would have to be rewired (Bill of Exceptions, Page 74). The city looked to Empey
6
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to do this work because he took out the permit (Bill of Exceptions, Page 75).
Defendant received one bid on the job from Charley W.
Goodsell for $750.00 complete, but Goodsell did not have the
pipe. He testified that that bid was before him and Empey when
they negotiated the contract and that Empey said he would do
it for that much and save defendant money, including all the
labor and materials (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 80, 81 and 82).
Defendant requested at that time that he offset the amounts
Empey owed him, and Empey said, "It could be arranged" (Bill
of ~xceptions, Page 82). The amounts claimed owing by Empey
to defendant are itemized at Page 85 of the Bill of Exceptions.
Defendant testified he had no contract with plaintiff and
no dealings with him at all until after the job was completed
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 91). All his prior dealings had been
with Empey (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 92 and 93); that the
representative of Builders, Inc. of Ogden present when Empey
took the contract was Andrew Isakson, who testified that he
was president and general manager of Builders, Inc. of Ogden;
that he prepared the estimate of the costs of defendant's service
station and garage and, based upon information obtained from
electricians, fixed the electrical costs at $750.00; that Mr. Goodsell offered to do the electrical work for $750.00; that he was
present at a conference between Empey and defendant at defendant's office at 20th Street and Washington Boulevard about
in july, 1946. He testified that defendant asked· Empey if he
had the necessary materials and if he could do the job for the
$750.00 estimate, and he said he could and probably for less,
and that at that time it was agreed that Empey ~hould do the
job for said sum (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 108 to 112, incl.).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS
Appellant makes and assigns the following errors, upon
which he relies for a reversal of the judgment appealed from
and as a basis for a direction from this court to the t·rial court
to make and enter a judgment as prayed by the defendant, to-

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wit:
1. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action (Bill of Exceptions, Page 001).
2. The tri~ll court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer
(Bill of Exceptions, Pages 004 and 005).
3. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for non-suit as against the plaintiff (Bill of Exceptions, Page
65).
4. The trial court erred in admitting evidence on behalf
of plaintiff (Question No. 7 on Page 36, Bill of Exceptions) as
follows: "Question: And Mr. Eklund said you were the foreman
on his jobs. Is that right? Answer: Yes;" (Also Question No. 10
on Page 36 of the Bill of Exceptions) "Question: And you were
his foreman on the job that was done on the Elwell property?"
and the answer, "That is correct," all of which were objected
to by the defendant.
5. The trial court erred in making and entering its Finding of Fact, being Paragraph No. 2 of the amended Findings of
Fact, as follows, to-wit: "That at Ogden, Utah, on or about
August 16, 1946, the plaintiff at the special instance and request
of the defendant and upon his promise to pay therefor did furnish material and labor in installing certain electric wiring, parts
and equipment in a gas station at 737 Washington Avenue in
said city and state; that the said material was furnished and
labor was performed in the name of Empey Electric Company
for plaintiff's benefit, and that plaintiff was an undiscovered
principal until on or about the month of November 1946, * and
that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was the real party
in interest as aforesaid. That it was for plaintiff's use and benefit and said Empey Electric Company claims no right or interest
in the sum owing." (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030).
6. The court erred in making and entering its Finding of
Fact No. 3 of the Amended Findings of Fact as follows, to-wit:
"That during said time above-mentioned the standard and· es8
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tablished scale of wages for an electrician in Ogden, Utah, was
$2.25 per hour, and for an electrician apprentice $1.25 per hour;
and said scales were approved and established under the OPA
law and regulations made therefor; *that the sums charged
for said material were also reasonable therefor, and the hours
set forth above were reasonable and were necessary to complete the said work as aforesaid, and the defendant promised
to pay for the same.'' (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030).
7. The trial court erred in making and entering its Finding of Fact No. 5 of the Amended Findings of Fact as follows: "And the court further finds that the allegations of defendent's amended answer are untrue and are not supported .
by the preponderance of the evidence*" (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 030).
8. That the trial Court erred in its conclusion of law "That
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in
the sum of $1361.82 together with interest thereon" *as set
forth therein.
9. That the court erred in denying the motion of appellant
for a new trial (Bill of Exceptions, Page 029).
,
10. That the trial court erred in rendering judgment in
favor of the respondent and against the appellant (Bill of Exceptions, Page 031).
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
l. The trial court's refusal to sustain defendant's demurrer
to the complaint. A discussion of this involves Assignments of
Error No. l and 2.

2. The admission of evidence concerning an alleged agency between plaintiff and the interpleaded plaintiff and hearsay statements that interpleaded plaintiff was foreman of the
plaintiff on defendant's job. This involves a discussion of Assignment of Error No. 3 ·and 4.
3. The trial court's refusal to grant defendant's motion
for non-suit as against the plaintiff. This involves a discussion
9
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of defendant's Assignment of Error No. 3.
4. Insufficiency of competent evidence to support or
warrant the Amended Findings of Fact complained of. This
involves a discussion of defendant's Assignments of Error No. 5,
6 and 7.
5. The conclusion of law that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment and the· rendering of judgment in favor of the respondent and against the appellant. This involves defendant's
Assignment of Error No. 8, 9 and 10.
6. The refusal of the court to grant defendant a new trial.
This involves defendant's Assignment of Error No.9 and 10.
The Assignments of Error overlap and run together in some
instances, but so far as possible the assignments will be discussed in the order grouped above.

I

ARGUMENT
1.' DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED.

The charging part of the complaint, so far as material,
reads:
"That at Ogden, Utah, on or about August 16, 1946, the plaintiff at the special instance and request of the defendant and
upon his promise to pay therefor did furnish material and labor*; that the said material was fur.nished and labor was performed in the name of the Empey Electric Company for plaintiff's benefit; *that a statement was thereafter submitted to
the defendant for said material and labor in the name of Empey
Electric Company; that it was for plaintiff's use and benefit,
and said Empey Electric Company claims no right or interest
in the sum owing.*" It will be noted that all of the allegations
set out in behalf of plaintiff are not statements of fact but are
conclusions. At the outset it is claimed that plaintiff furnished
material and labor "at the special instance and request of the
defendant." Then follows the contradictory statement "that
the said· material was furnished and labor was performed in
10
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the name of Empey Electric Company for plaintiff's benefit"
and the further statement that "a statement was thereafter submitted to the defendant for said material and labor in the name
of Empey Electric Company and that it was for plaintiff's use
and benefit," there being no statement of fact or at all as to
who Empey Electric Company was, whether it was an individual,
a partnership or otherwise, or whether plaintiff had any connection whatsoever with the Empey Electric Company. Then
appears the unusual conclusion that "said Empey Electric Company claims no right or interest in the sum owing." There are
no facts set forth that plaintiff is in any position to substantiate that statement. Empey Electric Company is not a party
to the suit at that stage of the proceeding; and based upon
the allegations of the complaint, there is no statement of facts
upon which Empey Electric Company would be precluded after
the entry of judgment from very well claiming the benefits
of the alleged claim. In other words, we have a suit filed by
A against B, based upon an alleged contract or arrangement
between B and C, C not being a party to the suit, and A claiming the benefits of the said contract or arrangement, and A
claiming that C, a stranger to the action, claims no benefits
therein; yet all of the business was transacted, the material and
labor furnished and statements submitted to B by C. Agency
is not alleged factually, neither as undisclosed _principal and
agent or otherwise. No assignments from C to A is alleged;
in fact, no statement of fact appears in the complaint, directly
or indirectly, upon which plaintiff's alleged claim against the
defendant could be substantiated; there are no facts alleged
which, as shown upon the face of the pleading, defendant could
contravert or admit but only conclusions. The deficiency in
the complaint seems to be so apparent that no authorities need
be cited to sustain defendant's position. The complaint does
not set forth facts from which it could be ascertained whether
plaintiff claimed a contract directly between plaintiff and defendant as appears from the first sentence in Paragraph No. 2
of the complaint as follows:
"2.

That at Ogden, Utah, on or about August 16,
11
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1946, the plaintiff at the special instance and reqt1
'f the
defendant and upon his promise to pay therefor. d furnish material.and labor in installing certain electr .at wiring,
parts and equipment in the erection of a gas station at
No. 737 Washington Avenue, in said city and state.''
or whether he claims that the contract was made between defendant and Empey Electric Co., for plaintiff's benefit; or
whether he claims to have been the undisclosed principal of
Empey Electric Co.
If, as alleged, the materials and labor were furnished and
performed by plaintiff direct, and at defendant's special instance
and request from plaintiff, then why were they furnished in the
name .of Empey Electric Co.? Why was the statement furnished
and demand made in the name of Empey Electric Co.? If plaintiff claimed as a third party for whose interest the contract was
made, the allegation is insufficient because it did not plead the
contract showing the intent of the parties when they agreed,
if they did, to benefit plaintiff. .

In Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 1413 it is said:
"It is a rule of practically universal application that
there must exist on the part of the original parties to the
contract a clear intent to benefit the third party. Many of
the cases in addition to holding that there must be an intent to benefit the third party, place a further limitation
on the rule to the effect that the promisee must owe some
obligation to the third party."

And in Montgomery v. Rief, 15 U. 501, 50 Pac. 625, this court
said:
"To entitle a third party, who may be benefited by
the performance of a contract, to sue, there must have
been an intention on the part of the contracting parties
to secure some direct benefit to him, or there must be
some privity and some obligation or duty from the promisor to the third party, which will enable him to enforce
12
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~on tract, or some equitable claim to the benefit resulting
m the promise or performance of the contract, and there
mt..6\;,. be some legal right on the part of the third party
to adopt and claim the benefit of the promise or contract."

f

1

No such facts are pleaded.
In Hiramatsen v. Maryland Ins. Co., 273 Pac. 963, this
court said:
"It is merely alleged that they ''are real parties in in
terest. But not anything is, nor are there any facts, alleged
to show wherein or in what particular either of them was
a party in interest when the action was· commenced. That
was essential if the defendant desired to tender an issue
in such respect." ** "It merely averred the conclusion that
they were the real parties in interest."

That is exactly what the plaintiff did here.
"The objection that the plaintiff in an action is not
the real party in interest, as required by the Code, ( 104-3-1, .
U. C. A., 1943) when available by way of defense, must be
raised by demurrer or answer, or it will be considered to
have been waived." Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co. 25 U.
263, 71 Pac. 209, and cases therein cited.
It should further be noted that while the compaint sets
forth transactions between the defendant and Empey, sufficient
to justify the conclusion that the relationship of construction
contractor and contractee existed between them, nowhere in the
complaint is there any allegation whatsoever that either Empey
or the plaintiff was licensed by the State of Utah to enter into
such contract. Section 79-SA-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, co-partnership, corporation, association or other organization or any
combination of any thereof, to engage in the business or
act in the capacity of contractor within this state without
having a license therefor, as herein provided, unless such

13
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person, firm, co-partnership, corporation, association or
other organization is particularly exempted, as provided in
this act."
The following section, numbered 79;5A-2, sets forth the exemptions, none of which cover the fact in this case; and Section 795A-3 defines can tractor as follows:
"A contractor within the meaning of this act is a person, firm, co-partnership, corporation, association or other
organization or any combination of any thereof who for
a fixed sum, price, percentage or other compensation other
than wages, undertakes with another for the construction,
alteration, repair, addition to or improvement of any building * or other structure, project, development or improvement * provided that the term contractor, as used in this
act, shall include sub-contractor but shall not include anyone who merely furnishes materials or supplies without
fabricating the same in to or consuming the same in the
performance of the work of the contractor as herein defined."
For penalty for violation of Act see 79-5A-10, U. C. A. 43.
And then the following section sets forth the regulations and
qualifications of persons applying for licenses. We think, since
the statute makes it unlawful for a person to act in the capacity
of a contractor without first obtaining a license therefor, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead in his initial pleading
that the contractor, whoever it was who made the contract,
did the work and supplied the materials, was qualified by being
licensed by authorities, otherwise the alleged contract is void.
12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 159, Page 655, where it is
said:
"So far as contracts in violation are concerned, it may
be s1:1id, speaking generally, that there is no distinction between acts mala in se and acts mala prohibita. Where a
statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its
14
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violation is illegal without regard to the reason of the inhibition, to the morality or immorality of the act, or to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statute."
And in Section 160 of the same work it is said,
"An agreement directly and explicitly prohibited by
a constitutional statute in unmistakable language is ordinarily void (citing a long list of cases), and no recovery
can be had thereon."
And this court held in Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 206 Pac.
553, that

"It is the generally accepted doctrine of this country
that every contract in violation of law is void. It is equally
true that our courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of nor permit a recovery of compensation under contracts made and entered into in violation of the law prohibiting them or declaring them to be unlawful." citing
cases, including Haddock v. Salt Lake City, 23, Utah 527,
65 Pac. 491.

We submit the alleged contract must show upon its face (in
the pleading) relying upon it, that it was a lawful contract.
While we have found no case directly in point under our
statutes, we think the case of Farrer v. Atlas Acceptance Corp.,
92 Pac. (2) 729, founded on our usury statute, is analogos,
where this court said,
"It is to be observed the complaint does not state where
the contract was made nor the domicile of either plaintiff
or the j. B. Burnham Company, the assignor of the contract. It is alleged that the interest is in excess of the ten
per cent per annum allowed. The allegations of the complaint show that the contract to be usurious and void if
made in or subject to the laws of Utah or a place where a
like law prevails. Where plaintiff resided or now resides
or by what law the lending corporation was organized we
are not advised from the complaint or otherwise, it being
15
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·not only easy but necessary to bring the cause under Utah
law to allege that the contract was made or is subject to
the Utah law; and failing in this, the complaint fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
demurrer (general) to the complaint should have been sustained. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to sustain the demurrer and to dismiss the action uriless plaintiff elects to amend."
Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion went even further
and said that
"I concur but I do not conceive that the complaint
would have stated a good cause of action had it alleged
the domicil~ of the plaintiff or the J. B. Burnham Company. Again it would have been uncertain as to where the
contract was made. Even if it were alleged that the plaintiff and the Burnham Company were both domiciled in
Utah, there is nothing from which it can be necessarily implied that the contract was made here."
It appears to the writer that the instant case is actually a
stronger case than the case above quoted from for the reason
that all of the allegations necessary to bring the instant case
within the jurisdiction of the Utah statute, that is, the contract
is alleged to have been made in Utah and performed in Utah
with plaintiff and defendant domiciled in Utah. Hence, under
Section 79-SA-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the con tract was
unlawful unless the contractor had theretofore procured a license to enter into the same, and contract fails to allege 'that
the party whoever it was, plaintiff or Empey, acting "in the capacity of contractor within this state" ·had a license therefor, as
.provided by statute. In the Farrer case there is nothing alleged
bringing the case within the Utah statute on usury. In the instant case everything is alleged bringing the contract within
the Utah statute, providing for the licensing of contractors,
but nothing alleged showing the contractor qualified to enter
into the contract.
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2. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING AN
ALLEGED AGENCY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE INTERPLEADED PLAINTIFF AND HEARSAY STATEMENTS
THAT INTERPLEADED PLAINTIFF WAS FOREMAN OF
THE PLAINTIFF ON DEFENDANT,.S JOB.
The questions and answers complained of, found on Pages
36 and 37 of the Bill of Exceptions, are as follows:
1

'Q. And Mr. Eklund said you were the foreman on
his job. Is that right?
A.

Yes.

Mr. Huggins: Object to that as being hearsay.
Mr. Nelson: I am asking him if that is correct.
Mr. Huggins: Was it stated in Mr. Elwell's presence?
Do you claim that?
"The Court: What was your question?
Mr. Nelson: I said that Mr. Eklund had stated that he
was his foreman, and I asked him if that was correct.
Mr. Huggins: That is hearsay.
The Court: Objection overruled.
MR. HUGGINS EXCEPTION.
Q. And were you his foreman on the job that was
done on the Elwell property?
A.

That is correct.

Mr. Huggins: Object to that as calling for a conclusion
of the witness and ask that the answer be stricken until I
get a ruling on the objectio,-t. Now, whether he was a foreman or not depends on the facts in the case.
The Court: Oh, just as far as his statement is conce~ned
it may stand. Objection overruled."
'
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Nowhere is it claimed that the statements of plaintiff to Empey
were made in the presence of the defendant but were purely
hearsay. The manifest purpose ·of the questions and answers was
to show the relationship of principal and agent between plaintiff and Empey so ~hat plaintiff could claim the benefits of the
contract. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of an
assignment from Empey, who negotiated the contract, whatever
it was, to the plaintiff. Hence plaintiff's only other possibility
of claiming the benefits of the contract was on the theory that
he was Empey's undisclosed principal when the contract was
entered into, as found by the court in Paragraph 2 of the
Amended Findings of Fact "that the said material was furnished
and labor was performed in the name of Empey Electric Company for plaintiff's benefit; and that plaintiff was an undisclosed principal until on or about the month of November, 1946."
Nowhere in the record do we find any factual statement to
show any connection between plaintiff and Empey at the time
the contract was concluded between Empey and the defendant.
It should be pointed out what a convenient arrangement plaintiff and Empey have contrived to i111pose upon the defendant;
if the kind of evidence offered and received in this case is to be
allowed to stand. Plaintiff stands in a position to deny any
connection with Empey if Empey makes a bad contract, which
he apparently did if the costs of labor and material submitted
by him are reasonable. Plaintiff also stands in a position to
deny the liabilities of a contract entered into between Empey
and defendant, because defendant had no negotiations and
concluded no contract with plaintiff; and self-serving statements made between plaintiff and Empey out of the presence
and hearing of the defendant and inferences which may be
drawn therefrom become then the basis for a finding that
Empey was the undisclosed agent of Eklund. Otherwise, Eklund
can show no interest in the contract whatsoever, and apparently
on plaintiff's theory, he should not be bound by the arrangements made between Empey and the defendant as to price,
offsets, etc. Minus the hearsay statements inferences and conclusions made by plaintiff and Empey, there could be no ques18
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tion but that defendant and Empey were the real parties in
interest, and plaintiff was not entitled to any judgment whatsoever.
Inferences are not sufficient to support a finding. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Mathews, 74 U., 280 Pac. 729.
In Sayward v. Dexter-Horton & Co., 72 Fed. 758, 19 C.
C. A. 176 it was said: "But it is not every contract for the
benefit of a third person that is enforceable by the beneficiary. ** The fact ** that the contract, if carried out according to its terms, would inure to his benefit, is not sufficient to entitle him to demand fulfillment. It must appear
to have been the intention of the parties to secure to him
personally the benefit of its provisions."
Approved and affirmed in the Utah cases of Brown v.
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 Pac. 597. Smith v. Bowman, 32
Utah, 33, 88 Pac. 687.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NON-SUIT AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff admits throughout his· testimony that he had no
negotiations with the defendant of any kind whatsoever before
or at the time the contract was let. He makes some weak effort
to show that in November, three months after the contract was
made, that defendant saw him down town and "hollered at
me", asking for a statement of labor and material. No one else·
was present, and the claim is wholly self-serving. But even
assuming that testimony to be true, which we do not, what
bearing would that have on the contract? None whatsoever.
Empey admits throughout his testimony that he carried on all
of the negotiations with the defendant and says the defendant
1
"called me to do it." Empey checked all the plans and specifications with defendant and the general contractor, Isakson.
He was asked about the price of $750.00 at that time. At no
time in the discussions was plain tiff mentioned, even inferen19
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tially. Empey was asked if he had the pipe to do the work with,
and he answered that he did. He didn't say his principal, the
plaintiff, had the pipe, but said he had the pipe, so that at no
place in the plaintiff's evidence is there any competent evidence
whatsoever upon which a..finding could be made or which would
support legally plaintiff's complaint, and the action should have
been dismissed as ag~inst the plaintiff at the time he rested.
From plaintiff's statements that the material went out of
his store (all so far as the record shows without the knowledge
of the defendant) and that Empey took it out to defendant's
place of business and did the work, it does not follow that plaintiff had any claim upon the contract or the benefits thereof.
The most that could have been shown by the evidence was that
plaintiff was a materialman and might have been entitled to
a lien had he sought one within time. He does not claim the
trade name, Empey Electric Company, but admits that is the
property of the· interpleaded plaintiff. He admitted that he was
not licensed to contract; hence any effort on his part to do so
was unlawful under 79-SA-1, Supra, and the permit from Ogden
City to do the work, as well as the license from the State of
Utah to contract, was in the name of Empey Electric Company.
4. INSUFFICIENCY OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT OR WARRANT THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT COMPLAINED OF.
In the event this Honorable Court should find that there
was some sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case or
support or sustain the allegations of plaintiff's complaint at
the time he rested his case, what evidence there was, if any,
was certainly weakened; and it appears to us completely and
effectually negatived by the evidence of the defendant. Defendant's evidence shows that during the latter part of july
or thereabouts, 1946, Empey and the defendant discussed a
contract to furnish all of the material and labor covered by the
plans and specifications prepared by the general contractor at
757 Washington Boulevard in Ogden. The plans and specifications wete on hand, including the contractor's estimate of
20
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$750.00 for all of the electrical work to be done and the material
therefor. Empey was advised that Goodsell had made a bid of
$750.00 to do this work and furnish the material; that it later
developed that Goodsell did not have sufficient pipe to do the
job; that the contractor was ready to lay concrete and that the
job had to be done immediately. Defendant asked Empey if he
had the pipe to do the job. Empey answered that he did. He
was shown the estimate of the general contractor for $750.00
and was told that Goodsell had bid $750.00 on the job and this
in the presence of the general contractor, Andrew Isakson. Up
to this point there is no disagreement in the testimony between
plaintiff, Empey and the defendant. Plaintiff was not present.
The defendant says Empey agreed to take the con~ract to do
the work and furnish the materials for a maximum of $750.00,
saying that he thought he could save the defendant some money
on the Goodsell bid and the general contractor's estimate. The
general contractor, who was the only disinterested witness, corroborated the defendant completely. The only conflict in the
testimony is a general denial on the part of Empey that he
agreed to take the contract at a maximum of $750.00, although
he admits it was discussed; admits it was the general contractor's
estimate; admits Goodsell's bid; and admits that he used the
plans and specifications upon which· the estimate and the bid
were made.
Surely the great weight and preponderance of all the competent evidence in the record is to the effect:
A.

That plaintiff was not the real party in interest.

B. That Empey negotiated for and concluded the contract
in his own name and in his own right and not as the agent,
undisclosed or otherwise, of the plaintiff.

C. That there was no assignment of the contract from
Empey to plaintiff, and
D.

That the agreed upon price was a maximum of $750.00.

,We fail to see how any other conclusion can be reached upon
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the record, and yet the findings complained of are diametrically
opposed to these conclusions and are not supported by or based
upon any competent evidence sufficient to sustain the same.
While this is a law case as distinguished from an equity case, yet
this Honorable Court may determine on appeal alleged errors
at law, "including the competency and sufficiency of evidence
to support a verdict or findings as rendered or made."
In re Yowell's Est., 75 U. 312, 285 P. 285, where this court,
speaking through Elias Hansen, Justice, said:
''The evidence adduced on behalf of the proponents
was sufficient to sustain the findings. In such case we are
not authorized to vacate them, unless we on the record are
justified in holding, *** that the findings are so manifestly
against the clear weight of the evidence as to indicate that
it was not fairly or impartially considered by the court
below, or that portions of it were arbitrarily rejeCted or
disregarded, or that undue weight was given to other portions of it, or that in considering the evidence and in
reaching a conclusion as to the facts, the trial court misconceived or misapplied the evidence, or was influenced
through prejudice or bias."
The above case turned upon the handwriting in a will
sought to be probated. The evidence was about evenly balanced,
except for expert testimony on handwriting, and this court held
that kind of testimony "to be of weak and doubtful character
as being of the lowest order of testimony" and that "unless
reasons are given supporting the opinions expressed, is of little
or no value", and held that it did not outweigh the evidence
received upon which the findings attacked were based.
In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mathews, Supra, this court
held in action at law, Supreme Court may review record for
purpose of ascertaining whether the evidence supports the
findings; and in Jensen v. Howell, 75 U. 64, 282 P. 1034, this
court said that in law cases "the findings as a general rule are
approved if there is sufficient competent evidence to support
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them and, ordinarily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest that
they are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a due consideration of it."
It appears to the writer that this is that kind of case.
This brings us to Question 5, the conclusions of law and
the rendering of judgment in favor of the respondent and
against the appellant. It goes without saying that if, as we
have pointed out, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
findings assigned as error, that the judgment in favor of respondent could not stand, because the judgment, if sustained at
all, must be sustained upon those findings. Absent, it has no
foundation or base. That being so, after the judgment had been
entered, based upon the erroneous and unsupported findings
Question No.6, a new trial should have been granted, and plaintiff's cause dismissed, and the issues should have been determined as between the defendant and the interpleaded plaintiff,
Empey, which we think, based upon the evidence, would have
resulted in judgment in favor of the interpleaded plaintiff in
the sum of $750.00 less the reasonable value of necessary work
and labor required to complete and correct the work undertaken
by Empey, to-wit: $88.30, as shown by the witness, james M.
Neill (Bill of Exceptions, Page 70), and less any offsets found
by the court to exist in favor of -the defendant at least in the
sum found in the amended judgment, to-wit: $137.23 or a total
judgment in favor of Empey in a sum not in excess of $524.47,
with interest and costs.
We respectfully submit that this is the maximum judgment
which should have been found against the defendant and that
that judgment should (A) be in favor of the interpleaded plaintiff, Empey E'lectric Company, or (B) that if the plaintiff as an
undisclosed principle is entitled to any judgment, it should not
exceed that amount.
Respectfully submitted,
IRA A. HUGGINS
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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